In many types of development project, direct provision of benefit to 'the poor' is a central goal. But how effectively is pro-poorness achieved? We report an independent ex-post evaluation of the propoorness of the World Bank-financed Programme d'assainissement des quartiers périurbains de Dakar (PAQPUD) sewerage project in Dakar, Senegal; we also review ex-post evaluations of previous donor-funded sewerage projects in African cities. We conclude that Dakar was a questionable location for major donor funding, given that this city's sanitation status is already much better than that of most African cities. If we accept the location, the Dakar PAQPUD project was more genuinely pro-poor in intention than most similar previous projects; however, many difficulties arose at implementation, and within the intervention areas, many of the poorest households did not benefit.
INTRODUCTION
Many types of development intervention aim to preferentially benefit poorer members of the community receiving the intervention, whether through direct targeting of subsidy at poorer communities, households or individuals, or some sort of indirect strategy designed to benefit the poor. There is an extensive literature on pro-poor targeting. Coady where governments are more likely to be held accountable and in countries where inequality is higher. Interventions that used means testing, geographic targeting and self-selection based on a work requirement were all associated with an increased share of benefits going to poor people.
Proxy means testing, community-based selection and demographic targeting to children showed good results on average but with wide variation. Self-selection based on consumption, demographic targeting to the elderly and community bidding showed limited potential for good targeting. Ravallion () offers a very useful review of statistical measures of pro-poor targeting; he also argues that targeting, as assessed by standard statistical measures, is of limited value for reducing economic poverty. Note though that Ravallion focuses on the impacts of pro-poor targeting on economic poverty; however, in many contexts water and sanitation investment is to achieve improved health status and quality of life among the poor, not primarily to reduce economic poverty. Where the aim is simply to target investment directly at the poorest households, we can expect conventional measures of targeting to be more useful.
Pro-poor impact is a fundamental aim of the major international financial institutions including the International Development Association, the African Development Bank and the European Investment Bank, and pro-poorness is invariably cited as an explicit or implicit goal in the project appraisals for major water and sanitation projects.
But how effectively is pro-poorness achieved? This article sets out to explore this question in the particular context of large-scale donor-funded sewerage projects in sub-Saharan Africa. We report an independent ex-post evaluation of the relevance and pro-poorness of the World Bank-financed PAQPUD sewerage project in Dakar, Senegal; we also briefly review ex-post evaluations of previous large-scale donorfunded sewerage projects in African cities.
THE PAQPUD PROJECT
The PAQPUD project (Programme d'amélioration de l'assainissement des quartiers périurbains de Dakar) was a major urban sanitation intervention that ran over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . The characteristics and outcome of this Project targets included 60,000 onsite sanitation facilities (mostly septic tanks) serving 270,000 people, public and school latrines serving 30,000 people, and settled sewerage systems serving 127,000 people in 11 low-income districts.
The total project budget was about US$ 43 million.
Basic project characteristics
About two-thirds of the project budget was allocated to onsite sanitation improvements in 33 districts (communes) throughout Greater Dakar: practically all communes in Greater Dakar except those of central Dakar. Householders were offered a wide range of sanitation improvements, including outdoor sinks-plus-soakaway, flush toilet and shower units, small twin-pit septic tanks and large septic tanks. About 75% of the construction cost was subsidised by the project; the cost-to-householder of the most frequently chosen sanitation option (twin-pit pour-flush latrine plus shower) was about US$185 (Guène et al. ) .
The remaining third of the project was allocated to the settled sewerage component. Unlike most cities in sub-Saharan Africa, Dakar already has an extensive and functional existing sewerage system serving about 625,000 people in the business centre and extensive residential areas (mostly wealthy and middle-income areas) of Dakar 
Pro-poorness strategy
Project planning documents explicitly stated that the project would be targeted at the poor, but did not explicitly define 'poor' in any quantitative or indeed qualitative way. Project staff within ONAS and AGETIP, and higher-level stakeholders in the World Bank and PEPAM (Programme d'eau potable et d'assainissement du Millénaire, the Senegalese water and sanitation strategy coordination group), repeatedly expressed the view that targeting of poor districts (i.e. geographical targeting) was sufficient, and that within-district targeting of poorer households would not have been cost-effective. Diverse institutional stakeholders also expressed the view that the low connection fee (22,000 fCFA ≈ US$44) was within the ability to pay of practically all householders (though, as discussed below, our results indicate that this was probably not the case). Guène et al.
() state that several targeting methods were evaluated at the design stage, and it was deemed that geographical targeting would be most cost effective given the costs of alternative methods; this was confirmed by our own interviews with project management staff and higher-level decision-makers. This meant that the subsidy was available to everyone within the project area, as long as they were willing and able to pay their up-front contributions. Guène Notwithstanding this stated policy of geographical targeting only, project staff involved in social marketing and community liaisonboth within AGETIP and within the local community-based organizationsindicated that deliberate efforts were made to target poorer households within each district. It seems likely that there was marked variation among districts in this regard, depending on the personal commitment of the local community liaison staff to propoor provision. In Sam Notaire, for example, we saw individual cases in which local staff had clearly made a special effort to ensure service provision to very poor households. In Rufisque, the local community liaison worker (coordinateur social) reported that he had tried to negotiate a microcredit scheme with the local council (la mairie) and the local branch of the Senegalese microcredit agency PAMECAS, in order to obtain credit for maybe 100 poorer households; a grant payment was obtained for about 10 households, but no grant or microcredit was obtained for the remainder. In other districtsfor example Mbaointerviews with local staff and representatives of the local council suggested that there had been little or no serious effort to target poorer households, as is supported by our survey results presented in Box 1.
METHODS

Survey design
The results reported here are largely derived from house- 
Poverty evaluation and cut-offs
For the purposes of this study, poverty was defined as income poverty: this was measured as reported per-capita monthly income, calculated as monthly household income as reported by the respondent, divided by number of people in the household (including children), again as reported by the respondent. Financial income is of course only a partial Box 1 | Definition of terms ability to pay -A measure (often simply a yes/no assessment) of an individual's or household's objective ability to pay for a given product or service.
exclusion error -A measure of targeting deficiency: here, the proportion of poor households who did not benefit from the intervention. The central focus of the present study. self-selection -Describes a system for distribution of benefit under which potential beneficiaries select themselves. For example, a pro-poor sanitation project could offer 100% subsidy of a sanitation solution (e.g. improved pot latrine) on the understanding that only the poorest members of the community will be interested in this solution.
stepped subsidy -Here used in reference to a system of subsidy reflecting householder income: for example, very poor households receive 100% subsidy; middle-income households receive 25% subsidy and credit facilities for the remaining 75%; wealthy households receive no subsidy.
targeting -Procedures to ensure that the benefits of a given investment are enjoyed by the target group, here poor households. a This can include direct measures to ensure that subsidies to households are taken up by the poorest households, and/or indirect measures to ensure that the poorest households benefit (for example, ensuring that project design is such that poorest households will be able and willing to participate). type 1 error -In the present context, inclusion error. type 2 error -In the present context, exclusion error.
willingness to pay -A measure (often simply a yes/no assessment) of an individual's or household's willingness to pay for a given product or service.
within-district targeting -Pro-poor targeting achieved by targeting at the poorest households within the intervention district/community; cf geographical targeting.
a Throughout this box, definitions refer to pro-poor targeting. But note that this is a shorthand: the relevant target groups considered in the present study include poor districts and poor households defined in different ways; but also districts/households with high sanitation need (notably districts with frequent flooding, and households without a toilet) and tenant households. These indicators of need (poorness, no toilet, tenancy) are often but not always coincident.
measure of poverty in the broader sense (which may be considered to include asset poverty and sociocultural poverty, e.g. lack of education); however, in the present context income poverty can be considered centrally important, as we are interested in whether low disposable income was a factor impeding access to a sanitation programme that required monetary contribution from the householder.
Given our data on reported monthly per-capita income for each household, we then applied three sets of poverty cut-off, 
Targeting measures
Within a given population and using a given set of poverty cutoffs, the effectiveness of pro-poor targeting (i.e. the degree to which the project successfully served poor households as defined by that cut-off set) was assessed by calculation of exclusion error (type 2 error): in other words, what proportion of poor households within the target population were not served by the project. This was calculated as 100-CRp,
where CRp ¼ percentage coverage rate among poor households, i.e. proportion of poor households that were served.
We also used these measures to assess targeting: (a) of tenants and (b) of households without a toilet. For some analyses we also calculated inclusion error (type 1 error) as CRnp ¼ percentage coverage rate among non-poor households, or targeting differential TD ¼ CRp -CRnp; TD gives equal weight to exclusion and inclusion errors; a TD value of 100% means that all poor households and no non-poor households have benefited;
a TD value of -100% means that all non-poor households and no poor households have benefited (see Ravallion ) .
RESULTS
Relevance
The relevance of PAQPUD must be judged with regard to: (a) the overall goals of the principal funder, the Inter- In what follows we focus specifically on pro-poor targeting in three districts in which the sewerage scheme did become operational. For comparative purposes, we also assess pro-poor targeting in another three districts covered by the onsite sanitation component of PAQPUD.
How well did the project target districts? Targeting differential À14% À47% À25% À8% À1% 18%
We have so far considered exclusion error (exclusion of the poorest) as opposed to inclusion error (inclusion of the less poor), as our central concern is poor-poor targeting; in terms of cost-effectiveness, however, inclusion error may also be relevant (see Discussion). Table 1 shows inclusion errors estimated for each district considering the target to be households with per-capita income at or below the Dakar median, and non-target to be households with per-capita income above the Dakar median. Inclusion errors thus defined were high (between 40 and 100%) in all dis-tricts except Sam Notaire. Reasons for non-benefit Around 50% of households in the settled sewerage districts did not receive a sewerage connection; in the onsite sani-tation districts, over 99% of households did not receive any sanitation benefit (though certainly the figures for sew-erage and onsite districts are not directly comparable, as the onsite sanitation interventions were spatially diffuse interventions over much larger areas). Why did these house-holds not benefit?
In the sewerage districts, about 70-75% of non-benefi-ciary households stated that they would have liked to participate but had not been able to, while about 25-30% stated that they had not wanted to participate (Figure 1) . By far the most common reported reasons for not being able to participate were inability to afford the fee and/or lack of a toilet, though in Ouakam another important reason was that the householder was a tenant (and thus had not been consulted by the landlord or the landlord had refused). Among non-beneficiary households in the bottom quintile of per-capita income, the proportion report-ing either 'wanted to but could not afford it' or 'no toilet' was markedly higher than in the middle and top quintiles (Mbao, 83% versus 42 and 0%; Ouakam, 43% versus 26 and 10%); these differences among reported income quintiles were not statistically significant at the 5% level, but this is probably attributable to the small sample sizes (resulting from div-ision of the full sample into income quintiles).
In the onsite districts, over 95% of non-beneficiary households stated that they would have liked to participate but had not been able to; very few households reported that they were not interested in participating (Figure 2 Full beneficiary households are defined as those that received an external connection from their plot boundary to a functioning network, and also had an internal connection from their septic tank (existing or project-built) to the connection point at the plot boundary; this internal connection may have been paid for by the householder or by the project. Potential beneficiary households had an external connection to a functioning network, but did not have a complete internal connection at the time of survey. This row shows the estimated proportion of the target population in each district with per-capita monthly income below the Senegalese national definition of moderate poverty. This then allows estimation of exclusion error for this poverty threshold: so if we suppose that the project should have targeted households with per-capita monthly income below the Senegalese moderate poverty threshold, then in Ngor an estimated 23% of this group were excluded, i.e. did not benefit. (Here we consider beneficiaries to be full beneficiaries; potential beneficiaries as defined in footnote b above are considered as non-beneficiaries for this calculation.) e Estimates of inclusion and exclusion error for settled sewerage districts refer to the whole population within the sewered district; estimates for the onsite sanitation districts refer to that proportion of the population served by the project. f These rows show other possible definitions of target, and calculations of exclusion error for each target: calculations are as described in footnotes d and e above.
far the most common reported reason for non-participation was lack of knowledge of the project. The number of households reporting that they did not participate because they could not afford it was very low in all districts, even among households in the bottom income quintile; however, we consider that this is probably because in these districts the number of households who were unaware of the project far outweighed the number of households who were aware of the project but could not afford to participate.
Thus in the sewerage districts inability or unwillingness to pay was apparently a major cause of non-benefit, despite the very heavy subsidy. It is important to note that the householder in most cases had to pay not only the connection fee but also cover the costs of internal connection from their toilet to the new septic tank; and also that we are dealing here with a householder report of inability-topay, not an objective measure. Nonetheless, the high proportion of reported inability-to-pay in the bottom income quintile suggests that this is a significant problem that should have been addressed in this project, and that needs to be addressed in ongoing interventions in Dakar and in similar projects elsewhere. Furthermore, the presence of a small but non-negligible number of households who were unable to participate because they did not have a toilet is a clear concern, as this means that the project was tending to exclude precisely those in greatest need. How then African sewerage project, and is clearly a model to be followed; but equally clearly, the very high exclusion error (i.e. non-accrual of benefit to the poorest households and to households without an existing toilet) is a serious concern for a project with explicit pro-poor goals and very high levels of subsidy.
The inclusion of richer households is a less serious concern. In view of the nature of sanitation provision in general and sewerage provision in particular, it is reasonable to suppose that individuals will derive a health benefit not only from their own connection to a sewerage network, but also from their neighbours' connections; as a result, the more connections the better, even if this does mean inclusion of less needy households. Independently of this public health argument in favour of maximal inclusion, however, there is an economic argument in favour of minimizing inclusion of the non-poor: this was a highly subsidised programme, so that subsidy of households that could probably pay for their own connection is inefficient. Inclusion errors (calculated as described in Results) were high (between 40 and 100%) in most districts; this ties in with the conclusion of Guène et al. () that this was not a cost-effective programme.
As noted, though, exclusion error is a more serious con- see Guène et al. ) . There are certainly disadvantages to doing this: all else being equal, a 5% increase in costs implies a 5% reduction in coverage; furthermore, 100% subsidy is likely to minimize any sense of ownership, and leads householders in other city districts to expect 100% subsidy in future. Perhaps the most serious concern is that, without a genuine commitment to serving pro-poor households, and in the absence of better planning to ensure inclusion of poor households, this approach would very probably have led simply to more subsidy take-up by non-poor households: in other words, offering 100% subsidy does not by itself ensure propoorness. For example: as noted in RESULTS, some nonbeneficiary households did not have a toilet before the project, and offering a fully subsidised septic tank and sewer connection would not have helped them.
It is difficult to precisely assess the costs of improving targeting, i.e. of Solution 2. However, the PAQPUD project as a whole had a very substantial budget for communications and social marketing (about 10% of the total, i.e. US$4.1 million;
ONAS ); we do not have specific data on allocation of this budget to the settled sewerage component, but if we assume that this was pro-rata to the infrastructure investment, this was a very significant expenditure of around US$190 per targeted household (700 households). In line with this, the implementing agency AGETIP contracted large social marketing teams during the construction period: in Ouakam, for example, 10 people were employed full-time over a period of about a year, with the sole role of mediating between the implementing agency and the local community (informing people about the project and the possibility of connection, through both community meetings and household visits; collecting connection fees from people who decided they wanted to connect; assisting in the negotiation of sewer placements; and assisting in the resolution of disputes between householders and contractors). With this extent of investment in community liaison, it seems likely that it would have been possible to implement much more effective targeting measures (e.g. full subsidy for the poorest households and households without toilets) within the existing budget, given well-designed procedures. In other words, we think this would have been fully achievable within the existing budget.
In fact, we suggest that a more appropriate system would have involved a combination of stepped subsidy levels and microcredit, offering full subsidy to very poor households and households without toilet, and partial subsidy plus option of delayed payment for other households.
If we suppose that the full subsidy should be available to the poorest 20% of households, and if we assume for the purpose of this analysis that the cost of this additional subsidy should be borne by the remaining households, this implies that the remaining households would have paid US$55 rather than US$44. This system is not without difficulties: definition of the most needy 20% of households is not straightforward, and requires both clearly defined procedures and community-level staff who are genuinely committed to pro-poor provision. Nevertheless, we consider that an approach of this type would have be the most appropriate for achieving both high levels of coverage and minimising exclusion error.
We also consider that there should have been betterdefined strategies for ensuring that landlords participated in the scheme, so that tenants are not excluded. Such strategies would have to take into account the risk that landlords who invest in sanitation will then raise their rents, driving out the poorest tenants.
The above has considered the settled sewerage component of PAQPUD, the central focus of this study.
However, it is worth noting that in the onsite districts, project marketing seems not to have reached many potential beneficiaries. If funding is insufficient to meet demand throughout the project area, it is clearly important to aim to disseminate widely and identify those in greatest need.
Pro-poorness of previous African sewerage projects
How does the PAQPUD settled sewerage project compare with previous African sewerage projects in terms of propoorness? We have assessed this through a review of pub- It is therefore clear that few previous sewerage projects in African cities have served poor communities effectively.
Nonetheless, some projectsincluding the Dakar projecthave had some pro-poor impact. The next section discusses ways in which future sewerage projects might achieve genuine pro-poorness.
Recommendations for increasing pro-poorness
Drawing on this specific analysis of the PAQPUD project, and on the wider review of previous sewerage projects in African cities, a number of lessons can be drawn.
First, though, we note that it is outside the scope of the present report to discuss when sewerage can be an appropri- We suggest that ways of achieving pro-poorness are as follows:
(1) Better geographical targeting at the macro level (i.e. deciding which countries/cities to target). Donors and international financing institutions often choose locations on the basis of likelihood of 'success' rather than degree of need; the World Bank in particular has a policy of targeting aid at countries judged to have a sufficiently strong institutional framework to support aid spending (for a useful review, see .There are certainly arguments for this approach, in general and in the particular context of urban sanitation; but also contra-arguments (again see Riddell ) . In our view, Dakar was not an appropriate location for major donor funding for sanitation: this money could have been more effectively spent elsewhere in Senegal or elsewhere in Africa.
(2) Good geographical targeting at the within-city level (district-level targeting), as seen in the PAQPUD project.
Despite within-district variation in wealth levels, most cities have well-defined socioeconomic zoning, with wealthier and institutional districts typically much better served than poorer districts and especially informal settlements. It is worth noting that sewerage will rarely be appropriate for low-density peri-urban districts; it will generally be a candidate solution only for districts with high population density, whether city centre or peri-urban.
(3) Well designed household-level targeting. We do not agree with the judgement of PAQPUD's planners that household-level targeting was unnecessary and non-costeffective: our results clearly show that, despite the high overall coverage levels achieved by PAQPUD, coverage among the bottom income quintile was poor. This programme was massively subsidised (beneficiaries of the settled sewerage programme bore only about 5% of the total investment cost): poor coverage among the lowest income groups might be justifiable in a marketing-based programme in which the aim is to leverage household finance and catalyse a self-sustaining and aspirational sanitation market; but it is not justifiable in a programme with heavy subsidy of household investment. In our opinion, projects like PAQPUD require careful planning to ensure that the neediest households will benefit (notably very poor households, households with particularly inadequate existing sanitation, and poor tenants).
(4) Low-cost network connection solutions, including sewerage from condominiums and related strategies for reducing the cost of local connections to a sewer main, as summarised by Norman & Chenoweth () . The technical solution adopted in the PAQPUD project was settled (solids-free) sewerage, which is certainly a lower-cost solution than conventional solids-transporting sewerage if septic tanks are already widely installed (as in Dakar). Low-cost connection solutions may significantly reduce the cost of connection, making connection more affordable to householders. However, it is important to stress that short-term cost-reduction strategies (such as use of cheaper construction materials or community construction) may be false economies; see Norman & Chenoweth () .
A desire to target poorer households should not over-ride other relevant targeting concerns: in the PAQPUD project a small minority of households had no toilet at the start of the project, and very few of these households benefited. Tenancy status and other social indicators of need (e.g. single-mother households, the elderly) may also be relevant.
As suggested previously (Norman a), sanitation planners may wish to consider an interesting hybrid solution, namely sewer connection of public toilets with associated sewered holding tanks, allowing for deposition of locally collected nightsoil/sludge. If properly planned and managed, this approach can potentially offer an effective and financially self-sustaining model for sanitation improvement in very poor settlements, at the same time allowing for future household connections to the sewer line. An approach of this type is currently being implemented by the Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company in areas of the Kibera slum in Nairobi.
Finally, we stress that it is important for there to be detailed and independent evaluation of the pro-poorness of sewerage projects, with the particular goal of avoiding the 'connections problem'. Properly designed mid-term evaluations will perhaps be more useful than ex-post evaluations: these provide rapid feedback within a short enough timescale to allow modification of programme implementation, and this may allow problems to be corrected, not merely reported. It is important to independently assess how many people benefited, not just accept nominal connection rates supplied by the project agencies; and it is important to consider the complexities of each particular project: for example, in the present evaluation it was essential to take into account not just whether each household had received a sewer-connected interceptor tank, but also whether the household had made the within-plot connection from their septic tank to the sewered interceptor tank.
Finally, is important to sample from the whole target population, not just nominal beneficiaries, and it is of particular interest to assess reasons for non-benefit.
